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Abstract 
We test for the stabilizing effects of political institutions on fiscal policies by examining the impact 
of two unlikely governors on their state’s fiscal policies. Fiscal policies are joint products of 
executive and legislative decisions. These institutional factors tend to moderate the effect of 
changes in the chief executive, as does partisan competition for office. Jesse Ventura of 
Minnesota’s and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California were unique—surprise—governors of their 
respective states. Although both governors were arguably less constrained by partisan loyalties 
than most others, the other institutional factors would still tend to limit their impact on public 
policy. Our evidence suggests that in spite of their unique path to office neither governor had a 
significant impact on their state’s expenditures or deficits. 
 
  
Keywords: Government Experience, Outsidership, Governor, Fiscal Impact, Minnesota, Jesse 
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Introduction 
The first generation of rational-choice models of policy formation implied that the 
individuals holding high offices have little effect on public policies. In the most straightforward 
electoral models, candidates converge to very similar platforms and are assumed to implement their 
promises after the election is won (Downs 1957, Coughlin and Nitzan 1981). In the most 
straightforward interest group models, it is politically active groups rather than elected officials that 
matter. The persuasive campaigns of organized groups produce a stable vector of policies where the 
marginal influence of opposing groups equals one another (Tullock 1980, Becker 1983), and the 
balance of influence determines policy rather than the persons holding high office, who reflect 
those pressures rather than control them. Men and women who rise to influential positions in 
government are likely to be further constrained by promises and habits of thought that garnered 
support during previous stages in their careers. Insofar as median voter preferences over policies 
and the relative persuasiveness of interest groups are relatively stable, such models predict stable 
public policies that are largely beyond the influence of any single government official. 
In the United States, the stabilizing effects of political competition are reinforced by the 
effects of divided governance. Presidents and governors have veto authority, but agenda control 
resides largely with multimember legislatures, where officeholders tend to have relatively long 
tenures because of advantages associated with incumbency. This division of authority as well as the 
internal organization of the legislature also tends to stabilize public policy (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962, Shepsle and Weingast 1981). The senior staff of important government agencies also normally 
have long tenures in their agencies, and careerism together with bureaus’ systems of formal and 
informal rewards tends to generate relatively stable bureau interests in policies and policy outcomes. 
These, in turn, further induce policy stability through their discretion over the implementation of 
legislation (Niskanen 1971, Congleton 1982, Weingast and Moran 1983).  
Although elective office holders appear to have significant discretion over policy while in 
office, the first generation models imply that their policy choices are induced by a variety of 
institutionally generated incentives, promises made, and habits of thought and action developed 
prior to accession to high office.  
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These classical models have been rebutted by what might be called second and third 
generation models of policy formation that imply officeholders have significant discretion over 
policies. There are, for example, analyses grounded in Arrow’s (2012) impossibility theorem 
demonstrating that individual office holders can have major impacts on public policy if they have 
agenda control (McKelvey 1976). Several recent papers suggest that electoral competition is not as 
binding on candidate choices as the first models assumed. The extent of convergence in candidate 
platforms is limited by differences in candidate valence or ability (Groseclose 2001) in even very 
competitive elections. Besley and Coate (1997) suggest that candidate positions do not shift during 
elections but reflect their own honest (and inflexible) assessments of ideal policies, rather than those 
of the median voter or pivotal interest groups. Moreover, even with full convergence in party 
platforms, differences in the competence of those elected to high office can affect policy outcomes 
insofar as better prepared candidates are able to more effectively implement the same platform 
(Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011, Congleton and Zhang 2013). 
There are also interest group models in which an elected or appointed official’s assessments 
of the relative persuasiveness of interest group efforts directly affects public policy (Pelzman 1976, 
Grossman and Helpman 1994). If so, systematic changes in the types of individuals elected to high 
office or appointed to regulatory agencies will have effects on the policies and rules adopted. These 
effects will be systematic if the candidates elected or appointed to high office differ in their 
openness to particular lines of argument or are more or less beholding to interest group support. In 
these models, institutions bound the domain of policy choices, but sufficient discretion remains that 
the individuals holding high office have significant effects on the policies adopted and implemented.  
This paper attempts to shed light on the relative merits of the “institutionally induced 
equilibrium” and the “officeholders matter” hypotheses by exploring the extent to which two very 
unlikely state governors had effects on their states’ fiscal policies. The two governors focused on are 
men whose paths to governorship were unconventional and so less likely to be constrained by past 
promises to interest groups, partisanship, or electoral pressures than candidates whose rise to office 
followed a more conventional path. Neither had significant careers in politics before winning high 
office.  
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Both men rose to high office through unorthodox, indeed unique, career paths and political 
circumstances. Jessie Ventura won as a third-party candidate with 36.9% of the vote against 
mainstream republican and democratic candidates. Arnold Schwarzenegger won a 2003 special 
recall election—the only one to do so in California history—in which there were many candidates. 
Schwarzenegger’s rivals noted his inexperience and lack of preparation for governance. He 
nonetheless won office with relatively strong support (48% of the votes). In neither case, could 
these governors be considered “groomed” for high office or known for their party loyalty, electoral 
experience, positions on public policy, or competence as policymakers.1  
If particular officeholders matter in the United States, it should be most evident in cases in 
which unusual men rise to high office through unconventional—indeed surprising—elections.  
Models, Data, and Method 
We use three models of government fiscal policies and four regression discontinuity 
estimation strategies to determine whether these two unusual governors had unusual effects on their 
state’s fiscal policies. We focus on three relatively lean models of state expenditures. A pure inertial 
model characterizes state expenditures as a simple autoregressive process generated by stable 
patterns of interest group influence, forward looking voters, and stable economic and political 
institutions.  G𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 × 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡   (1) 
Gt-1 is the lagged value of the fiscal variable of interest. Outsidert is a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 if the state has an outsider governor in year t and the value 0 otherwise. Jesse Venture was 
Governor of Minnesota from January 4, 1999 to January 6, 2003, and Arnold Schwarzenegger was 
Governor of California from November 13, 2003 to January 3, 2011. The “Outsider Governor” 
binary variable for Minnesota has value 1 from 1999 to 2002 and is 0 otherwise. It has the value 1 
                                              
1 This is not to say that these men had absolutely no political experience. Ventura had been elected and 
served as the mayor of Brooklyn Park Minnesota, a city of 70,000 residents. Schwartznegger had served as 
chairman of California’s Council on Physical Fitness.  
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from 2004 to 2010 and is 0 otherwise for California. An outsider gubernatorial effect is a regime 
change in the autoregressive process, which requires 𝛽𝛽2 ≠ 0 and/or 𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0. 
The second model assumes that fiscal decisions reflect median voter demands. We 
characterize the reduced form median voter’s demand as a linear function of his or her income in 
the previous period, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1. The lag reflects state budget cycles.2 We assume that voters have similar 
tastes, which implies that median voter demand can be characterized as a function of median voter 
income and unmodeled random events during the year that affect turnout and voter expectations.  G𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 × 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡    (2) 
In the median voter model, a gubernatorial effect would systematically change the government’s 
response to pivotal voter demands, which again requires 𝛽𝛽2 ≠ 0 and/or 𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0.  
Our third model of policy formation augments the median voter model with institutional 
variables that reflect the division of legislative authority and possible partisan effects. In cases in 
which full convergence in candidate platforms fails to take place, differences among candidate 
platforms are at least partially caused by advantages that parties realize by maintaining a stable 
“brand” or reputation for policy positions that differ from those of other party’s.3 Party affiliation 
thus tends to affect bargaining that take place within state legislatures and between the governor 
and the legislature. In a median voter model, such partisan effects are affected by random events 
                                              
2 This model may seem a bit simplistic, but consider the following structural representation of median voter 
demand for government service G. Each voter maximizes a utility function U = u(G, X) where G is 
government service and X is their private good consumption. Because turnout rises with income, the 
median voter’s income can be approximated with average income, YA. The median voter’s private constraint 
is X = [1-t(G, N, YA)]YA and her public constraint is c(G) = tNYA  where N is the adult state population, 
c(G) is the cost of public services, and t is the average tax rate. The tax rate will be a function of service 
level, population, average income. Maximizing utility generates a reduced form demand for government 
services of the form Gj* = γ(YjA, Nj) for state j with population Nj, and will be approximately (Gj*/Nj) = 
g(YjA) for per capital government expenditures. Treating G as a vector of services would not change the 
variable(s) in the reduced form. 
3 Such partisan effects are consistent with electoral competition models that include roles for political 
parties. In partisan models, parties create and maintain distinct policy agendas to retain their base of 
supporters (Duveger 1963, Alesina 1988, Grofman and Lijphart 2003). In such cases, one would expect to 
observe partisan effects but not office-holder effects, insofar as parties select their candidates for high 
office.  
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that affect turnout, voter expectations, and the unobservable partisan dispositions of the persons 
running for office. G𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 × 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂/𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 (3) 
GovernorRepublicant takes the value 1 if the governor is a republican and 0 otherwise. If the party 
in control of the senate is the same as the party of the governor, then Senatet has the value 1. It is 0 
otherwise. The House/Assemblyt takes the value of 1 if the lower chamber is controlled by the 
same party as that of the state governor in year t, and it is 0 otherwise. A gubernatorial effect 
beyond that associated with party and divided governance would be indicated by a systematical 
change the government’s response to pivotal voter demands, which again requires 𝛽𝛽2 ≠ 0 and/or 
𝛽𝛽3 ≠ 0. 
Data for the statistical analysis were collected from several sources. Median voter income is 
proxied with per capita real gross state products are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).4 
We use of average rather than median income because of the relatively higher turnout of high 
income voters. State level expenditure per capita and state level taxes per capita are from the Data 
Query System (DQS) of the Urban Institute.5 The governor and legislature information are 
collected from various online open sources. The websites include but are not limited to: the 
Minnesota State Legislature official website6, the California State Legislature official website7, 
California State Capitol Museum8, Ballotpedia- the online encyclopedia of American politics and 
elections9, and related articles on Wikipedia. The time-period investigated is from 1987 to 2013. All 
nominal values are converted to 2012 constant dollars. Summary statistics are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                              
4 https://bea.gov/index.htm 
5 http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm 
6 https://www.leg.state.mn.us/ 
7 http://www.legislature.ca.gov/ 
8 http://www.capitolmuseum.ca.gov/ 
9 https://ballotpedia.org/State_Legislatures 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1987-2013, in 2012 Constant US dollars) 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
MN RGDP Per Capita 27 48255.51 6796.85 37549.79 56152.53 
MN Expenditure Per Capita 27 6102.59 1086.63 4422.00 7626.00 
MN Deficit Per Capita 27 2748.22 741.42 1584.00 4164.00 
MN Outsider Governor Dummy 27 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
MN Republican Governor Dummy 27 0.59 0.50 0.00 1.00 
MN Democrat Governor Dummy 27 0.26 0.45 0.00 1.00 
MN Senate Dummy 27 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
MN House Dummy 27 0.33 0.48 0.00 1.00 
CA RGDP Per Capita 27 49544.07 6647.96 40714.18 58858.56 
CA Expenditure Per Capita 27 6124.26 1113.76 4613.00 7761.00 
CA Deficit Per Capita 27 3173.89 865.02 1966.00 4498.00 
CA Outsider Governor Dummy 27 0.26 0.45 0.00 1.00 
CA Republican Governor Dummy 27 0.70 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CA Democrat Governor Dummy 27 0.30 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CA Senate Dummy 27 0.30 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CA Assembly Dummy 27 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00 
10 States RGDP Per Capita 270 44229.04 8400.29 26305.93 72495.71 
10 States Expenditure Per Capita 270 5409.87 1163.09 3196.00 9132.00 
10 States Deficit Per Capita 270 2890.76 855.86 1447.00 5430.00 
10 States Outsider Governor 
Dummy 
270 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
10 States Republican Governor 
Dummy 
270 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
10 States Democrat Governor 
Dummy 
270 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
10 States Senate Dummy 270 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
10 States House/Assembly 
Dummy 
270 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
Single State Estimates of Fiscal Policies 
Table 2 reports estimates of the inertial, simple median voter, and institution-augmented 
median voter models of real per capita state government expenditures for Minnesota and California. 
Columns 1 and 4 report the inertial models for Minnesota and California, respectively. Columns 2 
and 5 report the median voter model estimates, and Columns 3 and 6 report the institution-
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augmented median voter model estimates. All three models account for most of the variation in per 
capita expenditures in the two states. Only one of the six estimates supports the “governor matters” 
hypothesis. The median voter model for California exhibits governor specific effects that are 
significant at the 10% level. The other five estimates imply that there are no discontinuities in per 
capita state expenditures or in the responsiveness of government that can be attributed to the 
presence of an outsider governor, which is consistent with a strong form of the institutionally 
induced equilibrium hypothesis. 
Table 2: Impact on Per Capita Government Expenditure  
 
 
 Minnesota    California 
 
Variable 
 
 
Expendituret 
Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
 Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
Constant 279.35 
(213.14) 
-1028.02** 
(454.10) 
-750.21 
(679.05) 
 127.63 
(350.34) 
-2422.68*** 
(670.56) 
-1964.77 
(1439.47) 
Outsider Governort 1165.30 
(1355.59) 
-2280.74 
(4845.58) 
-2558.54 
(4882.18) 
 4122.86 
(4716.38) 
6740.09* 
(3715.30) 
6282.18 
(3909.01) 
Governor 
Republicant 
  -180.57 
(260.36) 
   Omitted due 
to collinearity 
with the 
Senate 
Dummy 
Expendituret-1 0.97*** 
(0.03) 
   1.00*** 
(0.06) 
  
Outsider Governort × 
Expendituret-1 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
   -0.59 
(0.65) 
  
Per Capita RGDPt-1  0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
  0.18*** 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
Outsider Governort × 
RGDPt-1 
 0.05 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
  -0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
Senatet   -171.45 
(403.81) 
   -136.28 
(436.29) 
House/Assemblyt    -192.77 
(206.07) 
   362.45 
(260.08) 
R2 0.9732 0.9221 0.9324  0.9510 0.9182 0.9264 
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Number of 
Observations 
26 26 26  26 26 26 
Durbin-Watson d-
statistic(k=4 or 7, 
n=26) 
2.1972 0.9859 1.3294  1.8157 0.8302 0.9604 
 
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 3 provides estimates of the three models with real per capita state deficits as the 
dependent variable.10 Columns 1 and 4 report estimates of the inertial model for Minnesota and 
California. Columns 2 and 5 report the median voter model estimates, and Column 3 and 6 report 
the institution-augmented median voter model estimates. All three models account for most of the 
variation in per capita state deficits in Minnesota and California. None of the estimates support the 
“governors matter” hypothesis. There is no evidence of discontinuities in per capita state deficits or 
in the responsiveness of government to changes in average income when an “outsider” governor 
holds office. 
Table 3: Impacts on Per Capita Government Deficit  
 
 
 Minnesota    California 
 
Variable 
 
 
Deficitt 
Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
 Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
Constant 225.07 
(200.46) 
-1656.21*** 
(544.95) 
-1269.24 
(836.90) 
 226.31 
(277.32) 
-2854.13*** 
(888.61) 
-3204.93 
(1968.64) 
Outsider Governort -267.17 
(934.76) 
-6750.87 
(5815.07) 
-7137.85 
(6017.02) 
 2096.163 
(1409.32) 
7364.51 
(4923.37) 
7715.31 
(5346.02) 
Governor 
Republicant 
  -163.97 
(320.87) 
   Omitted due 
to collinearity 
with the 
Senate 
Dummy 
Deficitt-1 0.92*** 
(0.07) 
   0.96*** 
(0.09) 
  
                                              
10 Deficit per capita are calculated as the difference between real expenditures per capita and real taxes per 
capita. 
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Outsider Governort × 
Deficitt-1 
0.24 
(0.37) 
   -0.55 
(0.36) 
  
Per Capita RGDPt-1  0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
  0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Outsider Governort 
×RGDPt-1 
 0.13 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.12) 
  -0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
Senatet   -291.16 
(497.68) 
   -347.21 
(596.67) 
House/Assemblyt   -112.67 
(253.97) 
   333.06 
(355.69) 
R2 0.8937 0.7647 0.7847  0.8770 0.7607 0.7709 
Number of 
Observations 
26 26 26  26 26 26 
Durbin-Watson d-
statistic(k=4 or 7, 
n=26) 
1.5686 0.9388 1.0936  1.0901 0.8392 0.9184 
 Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Regional Panel Estimates of Fiscal Policies 
State level estimates of the factors that contribute to public policy may be deemed superior 
to other cross sectional or pooled approaches because every state’s political system includes unique 
features that affect trends and the sensitivity of policy choices to changes in political factors.  
However, a state by state approach limits the sample size, which can generate higher standard errors 
than feasible with other estimation strategies. It is possible that outsider governor effects exist, but 
that the small samples used in our single state estimates generate relatively large standard errors for 
the coefficient estimates and so reduce prospects for finding statistically significant effects. To 
explore this possibility, we assembled regional panels for California and Minnesota, consisting of 
one of those states and their four surrounding states. The states in these regional panels have similar 
histories, ethnicities, weather, and geography and thus are likely to have more or less similar political 
cultures.  
The adjacent first ring states for Minnesota are Wisconsin, Iowa, South Dakota, and North 
Dakota. The adjacent first ring states for California are Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. 
Within the upper midwestern panel, Jesse Ventura was the only independent candidate elected to 
10 
 
the governorship. Within the western panel, Arnold Schwarzenegger was the only governor elected 
through a recall election. Thus, both governors may be regarded as unique for their respective 
panels. The tables reported below and in the appendix provides evidence that these panels are 
distinct from one another in that there are statistically significant differences in income elasticities 
and other parameter estimates across the two regions. (See Table 9 of the appendix.)  
The panel estimation strategy is similar to that used for the single state estimates, but 
includes state fixed effects (Si) and year fixed effects (Tt).  The state fixed effects account for stable 
unmodeled differences among states and the year fixed effects account for common random 
macroeconomic and macropolitical shocks that might affect political deliberations within a state in a 
given year. The fixed-effects inertial model for the Minnesota and California panels is: G𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (4) 
with Si being the state fixed effect and Tt being a year fixed effect. The fixed effects median voter 
model is: G𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (5) 
The fixed-effects median voter model with institutions is:  G𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = α +  𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂/𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (6) 
Table 4 reports panel estimates of the autoregressive, median voter, and augmented median 
voter models of real state per capita expenditure models. The constant term α is not reported in the 
table, because it is automatically included in the fixed effects terms thus omitted. The ordering of 
the models is the same as that in the previous tables. The results for the upper Midwest panel are 
very similar to the Minnesota estimates of Table 2. There is no evidence of discontinuity induced by 
its outsider governor, and only very modest evidence of institutional and partisan effects. With 
respect to the western panel, we now find evidence of an outsider governor in the autoregressive 
model, but not the others. In the autoregressive model for the western panel, there is a quantum 
jump in California’s average expenditures per capita, but a reduction in trend expenditures 
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associated with that jump.  This effect does not survive the shift to the median voter models, and so 
likely reflects differences in California politics that the fixed effects do not fully account for.  
We also find evidence of significant partisan and institutional effects in the California panel. 
western states with Republican governors having systematically lower expenditures than those with 
democratic governors in the period of interest. Partisan and institutional effects are also implied by 
the significance of binary variables for state senate or house controlled by the same party as the 
governor. (The signs of those variables are, however, unrelated to the purposes of this study.) All 
three models account for most of the variation in state expenditures within their respective panels. 
Table 4: Impact on Government Expenditure Per Capita (Panel Data with First Ring 
States) 
 
 
Minnesota Panel  California Panel 
Variable 
 
 
Expendituret 
Auto-regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
with 
Institutions 
 Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
with 
Institutions 
Outsider Governort 1094.88 
(1476.80) 
-1918.77 
(4057.57) 
-1968.56 
(4021.65) 
 8220.03** 
(3802.44) 
-1071.28 
(4949.75) 
-463.39 
(3847.879) 
Governor 
Republicant 
  -81.58 
(66.28) 
   -576.39*** 
(84.94) 
Expendituret-1 0.90*** 
(0.06) 
   0.92*** 
(0.04) 
  
Outsider Governort 
× Expendituret-1 
-0.15 
(0.24) 
   -1.16** 
(0.53) 
  
RGDPt-1  0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
  0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Outsider Governort 
× RGDPt-1 
 0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
  0.03 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Senatet   -163.03** 
(76.26) 
   -165.19** 
(71.58) 
House/Assemblyt   71.47 
(65.42) 
   127.53* 
(68.45) 
State Fixed Effects        
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Year Fixed Effects        
R2 0.6820 0.4540 0.4802  0.8299 0.2028 0.5347 
Number of 
Observations 
130 130 130  130 130 130 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 5 reports panel estimates for real state per capita deficits (with state and year fixed 
effects). The ordering of the models is the same as that in the previous tables. The results for the 
Minnesota panel are similar to those of the Minnesota estimates of Table 3. There is no evidence of 
discontinuity induced by Minnesota’s outsider governor in the upper midwestern panel, but there is 
evidence that institutions and party affect the magnitude of state deficits per capita. Deficits decline 
with republican governors and state senates of the same party as a state’s governor.  
With respect to the western panel, we again find evidence of discontinuities in the 
autoregressive model, but not in the median voter–based models. There is also evidence of 
partisan/institutional effects on state per capita deficits in the California panel. Western states with 
republican governors have systematically lower deficits than those with democratic governors in the 
period of interest. This effect is reinforced by the support of a state senate controlled by the same 
party, although reduced by a same party state house. The negative coefficient found for the effect of 
above average state income on deficits suggests that states in the upper Midwest plan expenditures 
based on typical economic conditions, rather than year-to-year fluctuations in income. Deficits thus 
fall during periods of relatively high income. The positive sign found for the Western panel suggests 
that deficit finance is a routine part of their state’s fiscal planning. All three models account for 
most of the variation in state expenditures within their respective panels.   
Table 5: Impact on Government Deficit Per Capita (Panel Data with First Ring States) 
  
 
Minnesota Panel  California Panel 
Variable 
Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
 Auto-
regressive 
Model 
Median 
Voter Model 
Median Voter 
Model with 
Institutions 
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Outsider Governort 61.77 
(1006.36) 
 
-4457.76 
(4465.92) 
-4556.82 
(4242.98) 
 1677.39* 
(925.64) 
862.41 
(4323.30) 
1264.46 
(3670.97) 
Governor 
Republicant 
  -233.96*** 
(69.93) 
   -379.23*** 
(81.04) 
Deficitt-1 0.91*** 
(0.07) 
   0.87*** 
(0.05) 
  
Outsider Governort × 
Deficitt-1 
0.02 
(0.40) 
   -0.46** 
(0.23) 
  
RGDPt-1  -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Outsider Governort × 
RGDPt-1 
 0.09 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
  -0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
Senatet   -202.81** 
(80.46) 
   -167.44** 
(68.29) 
House/Assemblyt   166.96** 
(69.02) 
   154.33** 
(65.31) 
State Fixed Effects        
Year Fixed Effects        
R2 0.6204 0.5848 0.6368  0.7509 0.1367 0.3989 
Number of 
Observations 
130 130 130  130 130 130 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Panel Estimates of Difference in Difference using Synthetic Controls 
We next explore whether the evidence found in the single state and panel estimates is robust 
to other estimation strategies.  We next apply two difference in difference approaches, using 
different implementations of the synthetic control methodology (Abadie, Diamond, and 
Hainmueller 2015). In the first series of estimates we use panel averages as a synthetic control—
which is to say, we create a hypothetical average panel state that can be used as the panel norm, or 
as a control to isolate the treatment effect generated by an unusual governor. We estimate 
differences between state i’s expenditures in year t and the panel average for that year. We focus on 
the institution-augmented median voter model. An outsider governor effect will generate larger 
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deviations from the panel norm than can be accounted for by income, partisanship, and institutional 
effects. We use differences between the average real per capita state gross product in the panel and 
actual state per capita gross product as the income explanatory variable.  
Table 6 summarizes the results for the two variables of interest for each panel. Again, the 
models account for most of the variation in state per capita expenditures and deficits. Again, there 
is no evidence of discontinuities generated by “outsider” governors in the upper mid-West panel. 
However, we find some evidence of an outsider effect for the California panel, one that suggests a 
very large increase in per capita expenditures and per capita deficits, although the coefficient is 
significant at only the 10% level. Given the other results, we believe that this result is spurious and 
may reflect problems with pooling states in the Western panel. (California exhibits significantly 
higher income elasticity in voter demands for government services than other states in the panel.)  
Table 6: Impact on Government Expenditures and Deficits Per Capita  
(Difference in Difference re Panel Averages, Pooled Data from First Ring States) 
  
 
Minnesota Panel California Panel 
Variable 
 
Median 
Voter  
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Average 
Difference 
Median 
Voter  
Per Capita 
Deficit 
Average 
Difference 
 Median 
Voter  
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Average 
Difference 
Median 
Voter  
Per Capita  
Deficit 
Average 
Difference 
Outsider Governort -501.62 
(2447.99) 
-1924.95 
(2588.00) 
 4775.65* 
(2478.76) 
4049.64* 
(2367.56) 
Governor 
Republicant 
-81.63 
(66.35) 
-234.01*** 
(70.14) 
 -586.78*** 
(84.06) 
-388.58*** 
(80.29) 
RGDP Average 
Differencet-1 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Outsider Governort × 
RGDP Average 
Differencet-1 
0.06 
(0.31) 
0.27 
(0.33) 
 -0.84 
(0.52) 
-0.76 
(0.49) 
Senatet -162.97** 
(76.34) 
  -202.75** 
(80.71) 
 -163.94** 
(70.56) 
-164.56** 
(67.40) 
House/Assemblyt 71.44 
(65.49) 
166.93** 
(69.23) 
 114.69* 
(67.93) 
143.76** 
(64.88) 
State Fixed Effects      
15 
 
Year Fixed Effects      
R2 0.4791 0.6346  0.5470 0.4134 
Number of 
Observations 
130 130  130 130 
Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Our last series of estimates uses a more sophisticated method for creating a hypothetical 
reference state or synthetic control. We create a synthetic control for each state by estimating 
annual values of each state’s real per capital expenditures and deficits as a function of the other 
states in their panel’s fiscal outcomes (real per capita expenditures, real per capita deficits). Each 
state thus has its own synthetic control, which is, in effect, a BLUE weighted average of the fiscal 
outcomes in other states in the panels. The weights vary by state and panel and are reported in 
Table 8 of the appendix. The estimated values provide synthetic state governments for each state in 
each panel that can be used as the hypothetical norm or reference for the states and panels of 
interest.   
We again focus on the institution-augmented median voter model. Differences between each 
state’s actual and its predicted per capita expenditures and per capita deficits are used as the relevant 
dependent variables. In effect, the differences are now state-level residuals with respect to their 
synthetic control. We use a similar difference between the synthetic control’s state per capita 
income and actual income in the state of interest as the income variable. The estimates look for 
unexplained effects on the residuals associated with the tenures of the two outsider governors 
relative to that which would have occurred without them, as in conventional time-series applications 
of the synthetic control methodology. Outsider-governor effects on fiscal outcomes in their 
respective states should be highlighted by this approach. This estimation strategy is applied to the 
upper Mid-Western and Western Panels and to the states of California and Minnesota alone. 
Table 7 reports the results for each panel and the two states of interest. The synthetic 
controls for each panel account for most of the predicable path of real per capita state expenditures 
and deficits; and thus, the explanatory power of the models fall significantly. We find second-order 
effects for changes for average income shocks on real state per capita expenditures, but not deficits, 
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which suggests that state expenditures are normally adjusted to account for past tax revenue shocks 
(possibly generated by unexpected changes in average income in the previous year). We also find 
second-order effects from same party assemblies with respect to expenditures in the upper mid-
West, but not in the Western panel. There is, however, no evidence of a systematic effect of 
outsider governors on real per capita expenditures or deficits.  
 
Table 7: Impact on Government Expenditures and Deficits Per Capita  
(Difference in Difference re Modified Synthetic Control, Panel Data with First Ring States) 
  
 
Minnesota California  Minnesota Panel California Panel 
Variable 
  
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Weighted 
Difference 
Per Capita 
Deficit 
Weighted 
Difference 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Weighted 
Difference 
Per Capita  
Deficit 
Weighted 
Difference 
 Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Weighted 
Difference 
Per Capita 
Deficit 
Weighted 
Difference 
 Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Weighted 
Difference 
Per Capita  
Deficit 
Weighted 
Difference 
Constant -188.19* 
(89.98) 
-139.92 
(106.26) 
184.26 
(210.28) 
14.09 
(214.97) 
      
Outsider 
Governort 
139.91* 
(111.66) 
100.48 
(131.87) 
-28.99 
(147.54) 
56.11 
(150.84) 
 5.99 
(108.32) 
-200.19 
(194.26) 
 -132.19 
(169.36) 
9.55 
(155.36) 
Governor 
Republicant 
172.25* 
(96.58) 
183.05 
(114.05) 
-326.36* 
(188.59) 
-115.22 
(192.80) 
 -14.38 
(46.46) 
-17.63 
(83.32) 
 -123.74* 
(69.39) 
-103.60 
(63.65) 
RGDP 
Weighted 
Differencet-1 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
 0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
 0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Outsider 
Governort × 
RGDP 
Weighted 
Differencet-1 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
0.36 
(0.30) 
0.31 
(0.30) 
 -0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.12 
(0.25) 
 0.37 
(0.36) 
0.38 
(0.33) 
Senatet 171.71 
(132.67) 
247.09 
(156.68) 
Omitted 
due to 
collinearit
y 
Omitted 
due to 
collinear
ity 
 -35.32 
(53.42) 
50.75 
(95.81) 
 0.53 
(56.92) 
4.36 
(52.22) 
House/Asse
mblyt 
117.86 
(81.28) 
-70.87 
(95.99) 
36.08 
(202.10) 
58.35 
(206.61) 
 94.99** 
(45.73) 
-45.58 
(82.00) 
 -19.13 
(57.25) 
-4.32 
(52.52) 
State Fixed 
Effects 
          
Year Fixed 
Effects 
          
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R2 0.3525 0.1920 0.4270 0.2469  0.1384 0.0178  0.1047 0.0655 
Number of 
Observation
s 
26 26 26 26  130 130  130 130 
Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Conclusions 
Most of the statistical evidence developed in this paper supports the institutionally induced 
equilibria hypothesis. We find little evidence that unusual persons who rise to governorships 
through unorthodox career paths have unusual effects on state budgets or borrowing. If we assume 
that the results reflect a likelihood function across models and estimates, we can conclude the 
institutionally induced equilibria hypothesis is more likely to be correct than the governors matter 
hypothesis, at least for the states and time period explored. This is not to say that unusual governors 
had no unusual effects on the policies directly controlled by the governor, which are beyond the 
scope of this study, but it is to say that these unusual men did not have a unique impact on their 
state’s overall fiscal policies, at least not ones that can be discerned through statistical methods. We 
do, however, find evidence that that the party affiliation of office holders matter. We also find 
significant partisan and institutional effects, as found in many other studies.  
Of secondary importance for the purposes of this paper, but perhaps of greater importance 
for the literature on state and local finance as a whole, is that the parameter estimates differed 
significantly across states and panels. For example, we found significant partisan effects on deficits 
in the upper Midwest, but partisan effects on both expenditures and deficits for states near the West 
Coast. In both the panel and state estimates, the estimated effects of income on state expenditures 
differed by more than 2 standard deviation. Together these results suggest that the effects of 
partisan organizations, political institutions, and political culture differ significantly across regions.  
This in turn suggests that the use of pooled national data sets for these sorts of studies is likely to 
generate biased parameter estimates. Fixed state and time effects evidently do not adequately adjust 
for differences in governmental responsiveness to income and party, nor fully account for 
differences in political culture. 
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The support provided by this study for the institutionally-induced-equilibria hypothesis is 
limited to the institutional setting explored. State governments in the United States tend to have 
more fiscal discretion than most other sub-national governments, but are subject to more 
procedural constraints than confronted in many national governments. The effects of individuals 
holding their nation’s or region’s most powerful office is, for example, likely to be far greater in 
dictatorships and also in parliamentary systems in which a prime minister or chancellor can 
unilaterally make broad policy decisions that directly affect government expenditures, taxes, and 
deficits. However, for the United States, our results suggest that men and women with unique paths 
to high office are unlikely to have effects on policy that differ significantly from those of more 
conventional members of their political parties. 
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Appendix 
Table 8: OLS Weights for GDP Per Capita, Government Expenditure Per Capita and Deficit Per 
Capita When Constructing the “Synthetic Counterfactual” (First Ring States) 
 
  
  Minnesota Panel   California Panel 
 
 
State 
 
 
Donor 
States 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Expenditure 
Per Capita 
Deficit 
Per Capita 
 
 
State 
 
 
Donor 
States 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Expenditure 
Per Capita 
Deficit Per 
Capita 
MN IA 
 
ND 
 
SD 
 
WI 
 
R2 
-0.0466 
(0.1707) 
-0.0196 
(0.0359) 
0.1053 
(0.0973) 
1.1046*** 
(0.1227) 
0.9997 
0.6605** 
(0.2845) 
-0.1856** 
(0.0887) 
0.0234 
(0.1771) 
0.6646*** 
(0.1922) 
0.9995 
0.1036 
(0.2632) 
0.1437*** 
(0.0462) 
0.0252 
(0.1547) 
0.6787*** 
(0.1976) 
0.9976 
CA AZ 
 
NV 
 
OR 
 
WA 
 
R2 
0.5300 
(0.3199) 
0.0070 
(0.1762) 
0.2544* 
(0.1317) 
0.3581** 
(0.1702) 
0.9988 
0.9663*** 
(0.1965) 
-0.3839 
(0.2315) 
0.2547 
(0.1828) 
0.3626 
(0.3072) 
0.9981 
0.4077* 
(0.2097) 
-0.3269* 
(0.1734) 
-0.2141 
(0.2026) 
1.1478*** 
(0.3073) 
0.9946 
IA MN 
 
ND 
 
SD 
 
WI 
 
R2 
-0.0693 
(0.2539) 
0.0966** 
(0.0392) 
0.2833** 
(0.1063) 
0.7048** 
(0.2823) 
0.9995 
0.2875** 
(0.1238) 
0.2636*** 
(0.0324) 
0.1284 
(0.1138) 
0.2284 
(0.1489) 
0.9997 
0.0646 
(0.1641) 
-0.0541 
(0.0420) 
0.3897*** 
(0.0913) 
0.6303*** 
(0.1398) 
0.9987 
AZ CA 
 
NV 
 
OR 
 
WA 
 
R2 
0.2012 
(0 .1214) 
0.4226*** 
(0.0634) 
0.1185 
(0.0839) 
0.0757 
(0.1134) 
0.9993 
0.5305*** 
(0.1079) 
0.3914** 
(0.1621) 
0.0279 
(0.1409) 
-0.1318 
(0.2328) 
0.9980 
0.3463* 
(0.1781) 
0.1519 
(0.1688) 
0.3134* 
(0.1797) 
-0.0847 
(0.3586) 
0.9911 
ND IA 
 
MN 
 
SD 
 
WI 
 
R2 
2.1621** 
(0.8775) 
-0.6529 
(1.1955) 
1.0899* 
(0.5287) 
-1.4328 
(1.4759) 
0.9891 
2.8134*** 
(0.3463) 
-0.8622** 
(0.4119) 
0.0287 
(0.3819) 
-0.6113 
(0.4947) 
0.9979 
-1.2447 
(0.9664) 
2.0621*** 
(0.663) 
1.6273*** 
(0.4783) 
-1.2661 
(0.8820) 
0.9736 
NV AZ 
 
CA 
 
OR 
 
WA 
 
R2 
1.5589*** 
(0.2339) 
0.0098 
(0.2467) 
-0.4820*** 
(0.1347) 
0.1388 
(0.2180) 
0.9983 
0.5167** 
(0.2140) 
-0.2783 
(0.1678) 
-0.4852*** 
(0.1266) 
1.1170*** 
(0.1353) 
0.9974 
0.2239 
(0.2488) 
-0.4093* 
(0.2171) 
-0.6787*** 
(0.1840) 
1.6368*** 
(0.2710) 
0.9829 
SD IA 
 
MN 
 
ND 
 
WI 
 
0.8325** 
(0.3124) 
0.4601 
(0.4252) 
0.1431* 
(0.0694) 
-0.5450 
(0.5336) 
0.4087 
(0.3620) 
0.0324 
(0.2453) 
0.0085 
(0.1138) 
0.3719 
(0.2679) 
1.1346*** 
(0.2657) 
0.0457 
(0.2807) 
0.2057*** 
(0.0605) 
-0.4307 
(0.3148) 
OR AZ 
 
CA 
 
NV 
 
WA 
 
0.6730 
(0.4767) 
0.5485* 
(0.2840) 
-0.7421*** 
(0.2074) 
0.4808* 
(0.2538) 
0.0610 
(0.3080) 
0.3058 
(0.2194) 
-0.8034*** 
(0.2096) 
1.1979*** 
(0.2404) 
0.3726* 
(0.2137) 
-0.2162 
(0.2046) 
-0.5475*** 
(0.1485) 
1.4273*** 
(0.2543) 
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R2 0.9984 0.9988 0.9959 R2 0.9965 0.9974 0.9959 
WI IA 
 
MN 
 
ND 
 
SD 
 
R2 
0.3025** 
(0.1212) 
0.7053*** 
(0.0783) 
-0.0275 
(0.0283) 
-0.0796 
(0.0779) 
0.9998 
0.4062 
(0.2649) 
0.5145*** 
(0.1488) 
-0.1019 
(0.0824) 
0.2078 
(0.1497) 
0.9996 
0.7445*** 
(0.1651) 
0.4996*** 
(0.1454) 
-0.0649 
(0.0452) 
-0.1747 
(0.1277) 
0.9984 
WA AZ 
 
CA 
 
NV 
 
OR 
 
R2 
0.2511 
(0.3761) 
0.4509** 
(0.2143) 
0.1248 
(0.1960) 
0.2808* 
(0.1482) 
0.9986 
-0.1042 
(0.1842) 
0.1575 
(0.1334) 
0.6692*** 
(0.0811) 
0.4334*** 
(0.0870) 
0.9991 
-0.0286 
(0.1210) 
0.3289*** 
(0.0881) 
0.3747*** 
(0.0620) 
0.4050*** 
(0.0721) 
0.9985 
Number 
of 
Observ-
ations 
 27 27 27   27 27 27 
Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
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Table 9: Pooled panel with Ventura and Schwarzenegger (10 states, levels and natural logs) 
 Pooled Panel (level)   Pooled Panel (natural log) 
Variable 
 
 
Gt 
Median Voter 
Model 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Median Voter 
Model 
Per Capita 
Deficit 
 Variable 
 
 
Ln Gt 
Median Voter 
Model 
Per Capita 
Expenditure 
Median Voter 
Model Per 
Capita Deficit 
Outsider Governort -4362.45*** 
(1476.45) 
-3461.11** 
(1624.73) 
 Outsider Governort -7.352*** 
(2.732) 
-12.250** 
(6.154) 
Governor 
Republicant 
-323.59*** 
(48.78) 
-398.14*** 
(53.68) 
 Governor 
Republicant 
-0.064*** 
(0.008) 
-0.148*** 
(0.019) 
GDPt-1 0.069*** 
(0.006) 
-0.042*** 
(0.007) 
 Ln GDPt-1 0.414*** 
(0.049) 
-0.723*** 
(0.110) 
Outsider Governort × 
GDPt-1 
0.087*** 
(0.027) 
0.068** 
(0.030) 
 Outsider Governort 
× Ln GDPt-1 
0.679*** 
(0.251) 
1.130** 
(0.565) 
Senatet -186.01*** 
(46.48) 
-143.74*** 
(51.14) 
 Senatet -0.038*** 
(0.008) 
-0.060*** 
(0.018) 
House/Assemblyt 140.98*** 
(44.85) 
200.94*** 
(49.35) 
 House/Assemblyt 0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.064*** 
(0.017) 
Western State Omitted due to 
collinearity 
Omitted due 
to collinearity 
 Western State Omitted due to 
collinearity 
Omitted due to 
collinearity 
 
Western State × 
GDPt-1 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
 Western State × Ln 
GDPt-1 
-0.123*** 
(0.042) 
0.072 
(0.094) 
State Fixed Effects    State Fixed Effects   
Year Fixed Effects    Year Fixed Effects   
R2 0.5059 0.3159   0.4622 0.3296 
Number of 
Observations 
260 260   260 260 
Significance Measures: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
 
